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Abstract. G. Shafer views belief functions as the result of the fusion
of elementary partially reliable testimonies from different sources. But
any belief function cannot be seen as the combination of simple support
functions representing such testimonies. Indeed the result of such a com-
bination only yields a special kind of belief functions called separable.
In 1995, Ph. Smets has indicated that any belief function can be seen
as the combination of so-called generalized simple support functions. We
propose a new interpretation of this result in terms of a pair of separa-
ble belief functions, one of them modelling testimonies while the other
represents the idea of prejudice. The role of the latter is to weaken the
weights of the focal sets of the former separable belief function. This
bipolar view accounts for a form of resistance to accept the information
supplied by the sources, which differs from the discounting of sources.
1 Introduction
G. Shafer [1] has presented his theory of belief functions essentially as an app-
roach to the fusion of unreliable elementary testimonies, each being represented 
by simple support functions. However many belief functions prove to be not sep-
arable, i.e., not the orthogonal sum of simple support functions. Ph. Smets [2] 
tries to remedy this difficulty by generalizing simple support functions, show-
ing that any belief function is the conjunctive combination of such generalized 
elementary belief functions (where some masses can be negative). Using a retrac-
tion operation, he shows that any belief function can be decomposed into two 
separable belief functions. One represents the fusion of elementary testimonies 
(expressing confidence), and the other (expressing doubt) plays the role of a 
moderator that can annihilate, via retraction, some information supplied by the 
former, possibly resulting in ignorance. This pair of belief functions is called 
“Latent Belief Structure” by Smets.
In this paper, we present a bipolar belief function model which pushes the 
notion of “Latent Belief Structure” further. In a belief function, the doubt com-
ponent is assumed to reflect a cognitive bias interpreted as a prejudice, pertaining 
to the information supplied by the confidence component. This cognitive bias 
leads to weaken the strength attached to the combination of some elementary
_
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99383-6 11
testimonies appearing in the confidence part, thus expressing a lack of trust in
the information obtained by merging these testimonies.
The organization of the rest paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, some necessary
background on belief functions is introduced. In Sect. 3, we propose new results
about the decomposition of belief functions, providing new insights in the weight
function introduced by Smets [2], as well as conditions for separability in a sim-
ple case. Section 4 presents a generalized setting for the merging of elementary
testimonies in the presence of prejudices, focusing on the process of belief atten-
uation by means of the retraction operation. This framework is illustrated on
the Linda example [3], highlighting the difference between belief retraction and
source discounting.
2 Separable Belief Functions
In Shafer evidence theory, the uncertainty concerning an agent’s state of belief on
a finite set of possible situations, called the frame of discernment Ω is represented
by a basic belief assignment (BBA) or mass function m defined as a mapping
m : 2Ω to [0, 1] verifying
∑
A⊆Ωm(A) = 1. Each subset A ⊆ Ω such asm(A) > 0
is called a focal set of m. A BBA m is called normal if ∅ is not a focal set
(subnormal otherwise), vacuous if Ω is the only focal element, non-dogmatic if
Ω is a focal set, categorical if m has only one focal set different from Ω.
An elementary testimony T with strength 1−x in favor of a non-contradictory
proposition A ∈ 2Ω is represented by a simple BBA (SBBA) m : 2Ω −→ [0, 1]
such that m(A) = 1 − x, for A = Ω and m(Ω) = x, with x ∈ [0, 1] and is
denoted by m = Ax. The value x, we call diffidence weight, evaluates the lack of
reliability of the testimony (or the source of information). A vacuous BBA can
thus be denoted by A1 for any A ⊂ Ω, and a categorical BBA A = Ω can be
denoted by A0.
A belief function Bel(A) is a non-additive set function which represents
the total quantity of belief in the subset A of Ω and is defined by Bel(A) =∑
∅=B⊆Am(B). A BBA m can be equivalently represented by its associated
plausibility and commonality functions respectively defined for all A ⊆ Ω by
Pl(A) =
∑
A∩B =∅m(B) = 1−Bel(A) and Q(A) =
∑
B⊇Am(B).
The conjunctive combination of BBA’s mj derived from k distinct sources,







that m ∩© is not always normal. Dempster’s rule, denoted by ⊕, is a normalized
version of the conjunctive combination rule and is defined such that: m⊕(∅) = 0
and m⊕(A) = K · m ∩© for A = ∅. The normalization factor K is of the form







represents the amount of conflict between the sources. These two combination
rules are commutative, associative, and generally used to combine BBAs from
distinct sources. The Dempster rule is simply expressed using the commonality
functions as: Q1 ⊕ . . .⊕Qk = K.Q1 ·Q2 · · ·Qk.
In Shafer’s view [1], a separable BBA is the result of Dempster’s rule of
combination of simple BBAs: m =
⊕
∅=A⊂Ω A
w(A), w(A) ∈ [0, 1], ∀A ⊂ Ω,A =
∅. We call the mapping w : 2Ω \ {Ω} → (0, 1] a diffidence function. If the BBA
is non-dogmatic (m(Ω) > 0), this representation is unique, and w(A) > 0,∀A ⊂
Ω. Denœux [4] has extended this concept to the conjunctive combination of
subnormal BBA’s ∩©∅=A⊂ΩAw(A), w(A) ∈ [0, 1] ∀A ⊂ Ω.
Shafer [1] [Th. 7.2 p.143] shows that if Bel is a separable belief function, and
A and B are two of its focal sets such as A∩B = ∅, then A∩B is a focal set of Bel.
The condition A ∩ B = ∅ can be dropped if we allow for sub-normalized belief
functions. But the converse is not true. This necessary condition clearly indicates
that not all belief functions are separable. To overcome this difficulty, Smets [2]
generalized the concept of simple support function, considering Ax such that
x ∈ (0,+∞). Smets has shown that any non dogmatic BBA can be decomposed
into the conjunctive combination of generalized BBA’s: m = ∩©∅=A⊂ΩAw(A),
extending the range of diffidence functions w to (0,+∞). For every A ⊂ Ω,






3 The Bipolar Decomposition of a Belief Function
We can write the decomposition of a non-dogmatic belief function as m =
( ∩©A∈CAw+(A)) ∩©( ∩©B∈DBw−(B)), where
– w+ and w− are standard diffidence functions in (0, 1) defined from the original
one w associated to m, such that: w+(A) = min(1, w(A)), and w−(A) =
min(1, 1/w(A)),∀A ⊂ Ω.
– C and D ⊆ 2Ω , w(A) < 1 if A ∈ C and w(B) > 1 if B ∈ D.
– ∩© defined by m1 ∩©m2 = ( ∩©∅=A⊂ΩAw1(A)) ∩©( ∩©∅=B⊂ΩB 1w2(B) ) is the




,∀X ⊆ Ω, called decombination [2] or removal [5]. Gins-
berg [6] and Kramosil [7] have exploited this division rule.
– Factors of the form Aw(A) represent testimonies in favor of A if w(A) < 1,
and will be called prejudices against believing A if w(A) > 1.
A belief function is separable if and only if w(A) ≤ 1,∀A ⊂ Ω in the above
decomposition. In that case, the set of focal sets of m contains Ω and is closed
under conjunction [1]. So a separable belief function will be of the unique form:
m = ∩©A∈CAw+(A).
A mass function m can thus be decomposed in a unique irredundant way as
a pair (m+,m−), of separable belief functions induced by BBAs m+ and m−,
such that m = m+ ∩©m−. The confidence component denoted by m+ is a BBA
obtained from the merging of SBBAs, with focal sets in C, and the diffidence
component denoted by m− is a BBA obtained likewise, with focal sets in D. By
construction, C ∩D = ∅. The pair (m+,m−) of separable BBAs is called a latent
belief structure [2] more recently studied in [4,8,9]. The existence of positive
and negative information is generally coined under the term bipolarity [10], an
idea applied to latent belief structures in [11]. A general study of the canonical
conjunctive decomposition of a belief function was realised by Ke et al. [12] and
Pichon [13], albeit without focusing on its possible meaning.
In the following we are interested in retrieving the mass function m from
its diffidence function w via the commonality function rather by the conjunc-




sense for A = Ω, and we get w(Ω) = 1/Q(Ω). So function w can be extended to
the whole of 2S , even if only sets A ⊂ Ω appear in the decomposition formula.
In previous studies, w(Ω) remained undefined. Of course, w(Ω) > 1 but this
will be also the case for the diffidence weights of other subsets for non-separable
belief functions.
Noticing that m(A) =
∑
A⊆B(−1)|B|−|A|Q(B), and moreover logw(A) =∑
A⊆B(−1)|B|−|A|+1 logQ(B), it is clear that m is to Q what − logw is to
logQ. Since Q(A) =
∑












Note that in (1), the weight w(Ω) appears explicitly in all the expressions of
Q(A) for all subsets A. Hence we can retrieve the BBA m, from the diffidence





In particular we can have the following result:
Proposition 1. A diffidence function computed from m via (1) is such that∏
A⊆Ω w(A) = 1.





A⊆Ω w(A) = 1.
It gives a general definition of a diffidence function as a mapping w : 2Ω →
(0,+∞), such that ∏A⊆Ω w(A) = 1 and w(Ω) ≥ 1. Note that the mass function
mw derived from any function w defined in this way is not always positive.
Indeed, suppose that w(A) = λ < 1, w(B) = µ > 1, w(C) = 1, C = Ω otherwise
(so w(Ω) = 1/λµ > 1). By means of the conjunctive rule, one gets the BBA:
m(A ∩ B) = (1− λ)(1− µ),m(A) = λ(1− µ),m(B) = (1− λ)µ,m(Ω) = λµ. It
is clear that m(A∩B),m(A) are negative, in general. So the mapping m → w is
injective, but it is not surjective. Namely, given a diffidence function w such that∏
A⊆Ω w(A) = 1 and w(Ω) ≥ 1, Qw obtained by (1) is a decreasing set-function
that ranges on [0, 1], but decreasingness is not sufficient to ensure that masses
obtained from function Qw are all positive, i.e., Qw is not always a commonality
function. On the other hand, diffidence functions such that w(A) ≤ 1,∀A ⊂ Ω
are in one to one correspondence with BBAs of separable belief functions.
Example: Two Overlapping Focal Sets on a 4-Element Frame. Let Ω =
{a, b, c, d}. We denote {a} by a, {a, b} by ab, etc. Consider m with m(ab) =
β;m(ac) = γ;m(a) = α with α + β + γ < 1, (hence m(Ω) = 1 − (α + β + γ)).
Note that Q(a) = 1, Q(ab) = 1−α−γ, Q(ac) = 1−α−β, Q(B) = 1−α−β−γ
for other non-empty sets B.
We can decompose m as a combinationm = {ab}w(ab) ∩©{ac}w(ac) ∩©{a}w(a).
Its diffidence function is given in Table 1.
Table 1. Decomposition with focal sets: ab, ac, a and Ω
A m w Inverse solution




ab β w(ab) = 1−α−β−γ
1−α−γ
(1− w(ab))w(ac)w(a)
ac γ w(ac) = 1−α−β−γ
1−α−β
(1− w(ac))w(ab)w(a)
abcd 1− α− β − γ w(Ω) = 1
1−α−β−γ
w(ac)w(ac)w(a)
other subsets 0 1 0
It is a separable belief function if the diffidence weights are ≤ 1. Note that
w(ab) = 1−α−β−γ1−α−γ < 1 and w(bc) =
1−α−β−γ
1−α−β < 1 but it is not always the case for
w(a) = (1−α−γ)(1−α−β)1−α−β−γ . The condition of separability of the belief function m is
α2 +α(−1+β+γ)+βγ  0. Fixing β, γ, this condition is of the form α1 ≤ α ≤









provided that (1−β−γ)2 ≥ 4βγ. The latter condition is valid only if β and γ are




γ ≤ 1. Besides note that 0 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ 1−β−γ.
It is of interest to consider the special case when β = γ. It is easy to verify
that α1 =
1−2β−√1−4β
2 and α2 =
1−2β+√1−4β
2 . We must have β ≤ 0.25 otherwise
the belief function cannot be decomposable (α1 and α2 are not defined). For
β = 0.25 we have that α1 = α2 = 0.25. See the graph of the functions giving α1
and α2 in terms of β on Fig. 1. It indicates the zone of non-separability under
the line 1− 2β and on the right-hand side of the curve for α1 and α2.
Fig. 1. Left: m(a) in terms of β = γ if w(a) = 1. Right: diffidence weights in terms
of α
It may sound strange that there are two separability thresholds α1 and α2.
Actually, it means that, fixing β and γ, there are still two possibilities for choos-
ing m(a) such that m is the conjunctive combination of two SBBAs mb and mc
respectively focused on ab and ac. Let λ = mb(ab) and µ = mc(ac). By defini-
tion, we have β = λ(1−µ) and γ = (1−λ)µ. Suppose without loss of generality
that λµ ≤ (1− λ)(1− µ). There are two possible choices for mb and mc:
– m1b(ab) = λ and m
1
c(ac) = µ. Then α1 = λµ, where a is weakly supported.
– m2b(ab) = 1 − µ and m2c(ac) = 1 − λ. Then α2 = (1 − λ)(1 − µ), where a is
strongly supported (λµ is small). Note that m1b(ab) = 1−m2c(ac).
When m defined by parameters α, β, γ is separable, we get w(a) = 1, which
leads to the condition (α + β)(α + γ) = α. Hence w(ab) = 1 − α − β and
w(ac) = 1 − α − γ. So we can define mb(ab) = α + β, mb(Ω) = 1 − α − β; and
mc(ac) = α+ γ, mc(Ω) = 1− α− γ. Choosing α = α1 or α2 leads to respective






c). We can check that indeed these pairs
are related by the condition m1b(ab) = 1−m2c(ac), that is, α1 + β + α2 + γ = 1.
Finally, we can study the variation of the diffidence weights when α ranges
from 0 to its maximum 1−β−γ. Note that w(a) is the mass of Ω for the SBBA
ma focusing on a, when considering the decomposition of the BBA m. The less
w(a) the stronger is the testimony pointing to a, the testimony is not present
if w(a) = 1, and it becomes a prejudice against a when w(a) > 1. It can be
checked (see Fig. 1 right) that:
– For α = 0, we get w(a) = (1−β)(1−γ)1−β−γ > 1.
– w(a) decreases with α until a value α = 1−β−γ−√βγ where the derivative











γ ≤ 1, as seen earlier. When α1 and α2 exist, α1 ≤ α ≤ α2,





– w(a) increases with α ≥ α and limα→1−β−γ w(a) = +∞.
Looking at the right part of Fig. 1, we note that when α = 0, w(a) > 1 and
testimonies in favor of ab and ac are weak; so the prejudice against a is strong
enough to erase the focal set a from m. When w(a) reaches its minimal value,
the prejudice in favor of a is maximal. When α is close to its maximum value
1−β−γ, testimonies in favor of ab and ac are less and less challenged since their
diffidence weights get close to 0, while the prejudice against a rapidly increases
to infinity. At the limit, we get a dogmatic belief function with m(a) = 1−β−γ
and the prejudice no longer compensates the elementary testimonies in favor of
ab and ac.
4 Prejudiced Information Fusion
A generalized SBBA focused on a subset E with diffidence weight x represents
the idea that “one has some reason to believe that the actual world is in E (and
nothing more)” when x is small (x < 1), whereas, when x > 1, it expresses
the idea that “one has some reason not to believe that the actual world is in
E” [2], what we called prejudice. Note that the latter does not mean that we
have a reason to believe the complement E of E (which would mean assigning
a weight x < 1 to E). In this section, we try to provide an interpretation of
non-separable belief functions in terms of merging elementary testimonies with
prejudices that weaken the result of the former merging. The idea is that the
agent possessing a prejudice of strength y > 1 against believing E is ready to
doubt about the truth of E whenever receiving a testimony claiming that E is
true. More generally, the combination Ax ∩©By of a simple BBA Ax, x < 1 with
a simple prejudice By, y > 1 yields the diffidence function w(·) such that:
if B = A,w(E) =


x if E = A
y if E = B
1 otherwise.
(2)
and w(A) = xy if A = B. So, it is a belief function if and only if A = B
and xy < 1. It is equivalent to erode the testimony Ax with another testimony
A1/y using retraction. In particular, Ax ∩©A1/x yields total ignorance. However,
erosion cannot alter Ax by retracting B = A.
We can compare the erosion with discounting an SSB Ax: the discounting
procedure reduces the mass 1−x bearing on A with a factor δ ∈ [0, 1] and yields
mδ(A) = A
(1−δ)+δ.x, which is equal to Axy provided that 0 < δ = 1−xy1−x ≤ 1
since y > 1, that is 1 < y < 1/x.
More generally we can retract a focal set B from a separable mass function
m. Consider m = ∩©ki=1Awii and its combination with a prejudice Bx, x > 1.





i∈I wi (where we allow that some EI ’s may be iden-
tical). Combining this mass function with ExJ yields a mass function m
′ such
that m′(EJ ) = xm(EJ ) + (1 − x)(
∑
I⊆J m(EI))= xm(EJ) + (1− x)Bel(EJ)
(where E∅ = Ω). So EI is erased from the focal sets of m by ExJ if and only if




= 1/(1−∏i∈J(1−wi)), which is clearly more
than 1. Note that we can erode a single focal set via retraction, while discount-
ing affects all focal sets to the same extent. Similarly, it can be checked that




i∈I\J(1 − wi)(1 − x + x
∏
i∈J(1 − wi)) = 0 if
and only if x = 1/(1−∏i∈J(1− wi)) again, while if J ⊂ I, m′(EI) = xm(EI),
which is provably less than 1. In other words, retracting the focal set EJ erases
all focal sets EI ⊂ EJ as well, namely all combinations between the merging of
information from sources indexed in J , with information from other sources.
So we can consider that any belief function comes from merging unreliable
elementary testimonies, with prejudices that weaken the weights pertaining to
the conjunctions of information items coming from sources. It is indeed natural
to consider that information we receive from the outside is challenged by our
prior information taking the form of stereotypes, or prejudices that one is often
unaware of. The receiver is reluctant to consider the result of such conjunction
valid. For instance, consider a variant of the Linda problem [3]. In this case,
the bank teller Linda, depicted as a philanthropist, is found by participants
to a psychological experiment, more likely to be a philanthropist bank teller
than a bank teller, because the former looks more “representative” or typical of
persons who might fit the description of Linda. Here we consider the case when
we receive two testimonies, namely one (Bv) claiming that Linda is a banker
and another one Aw that she is a philanthropist. The fusion process leads us to
allocate a belief degree (1 − v)(1 − w) to the fact that she is a philanthropist
bank teller. However, a prejudiced individual would hardly believe that a bank
teller can be philanthropist, and would like to erode, possibly erase, this belief
by combining the result of the fusion with the generalized SSB (A ∩ B)u with
1 < u ≤ 1/(v+w−vw), which leads to a belief degree equal to 1−(u+v−vw)u,
that is all the lesser as the prejudice is strong.
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the decomposition of a belief function into a combination of
generalized simple support functions proposed by Smets [2] showing that it can
be viewed as the merging of uncertain testimonies and of prejudices against the
results of their partial conjunctions. We have laid bare new formal properties of
the diffidence function w and shown how to reconstruct the BBA m from it via
Moebius-like transforms. Our results strengthen the approach to belief function
based on the merging of pieces of evidence, as opposed to the approach based on
upper and lower probability. Future research can be a study of the information
ordering based on diffidence functions, introduced by Denœux [4], on which our
results can shed more light.
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